Dieses gemeinsame Arbeitspapier des Centre for European Policy Studies und des International Institute for Strategic Studies besteht aus drei Analysen des iranischen Nuklearprogramms, die aus unterschiedlichen nationalen Perspektiven vorgenommen werden.
The election victory of right-wing extremist Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad in Iran has sparked global fears for the future of talks over the country’s nuclear programme. This paper presents three different national perspectives, each one analysing the potential threat from a particular viewpoint.
Firstly, Francois Heisbourg presents a European perspective and considers how months of negotiations may come to nothing following the regime change. New leader Ahmadi-Nejad has declared adopting a hard-line stance and continuing Iran’s programme to develop nuclear energy. According to Heisbourg, recent events have resulted in the EU assuming several main strategic goals:
In addition to US concerns about the regional effects of Iran going nuclear, the EU emphasises the potential consequences of Iran’s policies for the future of the multilateral proliferation regime: an Iranian de facto or de jure departure from the disciplines and objectives of the NPT would set a precedent vastly compounding the consequences of North Korea’s NPT opt-out. The dynamic of nuclear proliferation would return to its logic of the 1950s and 1960s, with the ensuing rapid spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and East Asia. The EU’s vision has the merit of avoiding the establishment of incoherent goals (i.e. the freedom deficit versus nuclear affairs).
Heisbourg also outlines what he believes to be Iran’s three main policy objectives. The first priority is the avoidance of regime change. The second priority is to sustain Iran’s ability to keep its population and notably its youth satisfied. If high oil prices can provide the money with which to buy off various constituencies, it still does not create jobs. For that purpose, foreign investment and unfettered access to global capital markets are required. Third are the strategic aspects. In today’s Middle East, Iran is not an underdog in strategic terms. It is more powerful than any of its not-so-friendly Arab neighbours.
As a result of all these factors, Heisbourg suggests that there are three basic scenarios open to the West.
- Drift and failure Since the autumn of 2003, the EU-3 group has had a remarkable record of keeping the negotiations in play notwithstanding their rather weak hand. The temptation may therefore be to simply continue on the basis of current practice, for instance not taking seriously the undertaking to come up with a detailed set of substantive proposals by the time the negotiators reconvene in mid-summer 2005 after the Iranian presidential elections. That, however, is simply not going to work: Iran, for reasons of national pride and regime stability, will not accept an outcome in which it foregoes its nuclear fuelcycle activity without any substantial quid pro quos or exceptions (or both).
- Deliberate escalation In this scenario, the US arrives at the determination that Iran is not going to abandon “what we conclude is an active nuclear weapons program”. Furthermore, it decides to treat the ‘freedom deficit’ with the cure of ‘regime change’. The Europeans would be invited to use their economic and political sticks (e.g. sanctions and the downgrading of diplomatic relations) independently of a presumably indecisive UNSC resolution. Needless to say, this would create a transatlantic divide of Iraqi-crisis proportions. Whether the EU would remain united or not, with or against the US policy, would be a matter of circumstance. But chances are that this would look more like a remake of Vietnam (with no European support) than Iraq (with a divided Europe).
- Bargain or bust In this scenario, a determined attempt would be made to strike a grand bargain with Iran. Success would be measured by the following benchmarks: Iran stays in the NPT; it ratifies the IAEA’s model additional protocol; it does not resume the currently suspended fuel-cycle activity. Iran ceases its testing of intermediate range ballistic missiles of the Shahab missile family and does not deploy them (such restraint would not preclude Iran from engaging in a Japanese- or Brazilian-style space programme if it so desired).
The second paper by Patrick Clawson entitled: Influence, Deter and Contain – The Middle Path for Responding to Iran’s Nuclear Programme presents the scenario from an American point of view. According to Clawson, too much of the discussion about responses to Iran’s nuclear programme is concentrated on the extreme solutions: either attack or appease. Yet there are a wide range of intermediate policy options that hold much more promise. Western governments need to step up consultation about how to influence, deter and contain Iran’s programme, which Clawson proceeds to outline in more detail.
The final paper by Vladimir Sazhin offers a Russian perspective to the events unfolding in Iran. According to Sazhin, any country has the right to develop powerful nuclear production for peaceful purposes. Touching on the Russian-Iranian contacts in nuclear power production, Sazhin points out the following: Russia must take a pragmatic approach, based on the development of mutually advantageous trade and economic contacts and on the strengthening of its own positions on Iran’s nuclear power production market. At the same time, it must keep a vigilant watch on the ongoing processes of Iran’s nuclear programme – including those concerning dual-use technologies – and do its utmost to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. Additionally, Sazhin insists that Russia must act in cooperation with the EU and the US, with which it is in full agreement on this issue. This means that Russia’s relations with Iran are likely to be characterised as ‘cautious cooperation’.
Please click here to read the working paper in full.