Alister Miskimmon, Dozent für Politik und Internationale Beziehungen an der University of London, schreibt in diesem Digest von Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De über die Evolution der britisch-deutschen Beziehungen in den vergangenen sieben Jahren und ihre Perspektiven.
Excerpts:
If 1998 represented a high-point in recent British-German relations, the final days of the Red-Green government in 2005 have been marked by clear tensions between Berlin and London. These tensions stem from major differences between the Blair and Schroeder government in foreign policy and Schroeder’s apparent rejection of the principles of the British economic model for the European Union. Considering the mood of optimism surrounding the early period of the bilateral relationship under Blair and Schroeder, observers are left with a feeling of, ‚why did it all go wrong?‘, when reviewing the balance sheet of the Red-Green government’s seven years in office.
The victory of the Red/Green coalition in the 1998 Federal elections created a sense of optimism for improved British-German relations. The electoral success of Labour and the SPD/Greens represented real change in the political landscape of Germany and the UK. Closer relations between the two states presented Germany with an opportunity to break out of the strategic straightjacket of the Franco-German tandem and raised the possibility of a more engaged British European policy. The buoyancy of this reinvigorated relationship was reinforced by the development in 1999 of the Third Way/Neue Mitte agenda masterminded by Peter Mandelson of the Labour Party and Bodo Hombach of the SPD. Whilst the Third Way presented a relatively acceptable narrative for New Labour, the Neue Mitte sparked heated discussion within the SPD and failed to have any significant impact. Improved British-German relations opened up the potential of a strategic triangle emerging between London, Berlin and Paris within the EU.
The period 1998-2002 witnessed relatively strong relations between Berlin and London. Good bilateral relations were reinforced by initial European and the American efforts to forge a common strategy to confront the rise of international terrorism after September 11, 2001. Germany’s solidarity with the USA after the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York was most visibly demonstrated in its active military engagement in Afghanistan. This signalled a new German readiness to play its part in international crisis management which already began with the Red-Green government’s decision to participate in the military operation in Kosovo in 1999. Germany also played a major role in getting the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) off the ground. ESDP was a major pillar of Blair’s determination for the UK to play a more influential role in the EU under the concept of ’step change‘ in British European policy. Germany’s support for this initiative was vital for its success.
By contrast to the rather promising developments during Schroeder’s first term in office, his second term witnessed two main divergences, centred on foreign and economic policy: First, in terms of foreign policy London and Berlin have found themselves on opposite sides of the argument on a number of key foreign policy issues which have emerged since September 11, 2001. Of central importance has been the Iraq war of 2003. Schroeder’s decision to make Iraq a central issue in his bid for re-election in 2002 greatly complicated German-American relations which in turn reverberated in relations between London and Berlin. British-German relations in recent years have also displayed tensions over the future direction and strategy of ESDP (though less so on concrete operations, such as the European successor to NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia). These divergences were most clearly reflected in the dispute over an „independent“ military planning cell in the outskirts of Brussels in Tervuren which London opposed energetically. On the positive side of the foreign policy agenda, Germany, the UK and France have demonstrated considerable cohesion in their dealings with Teheran over Iran’s determination to develop nuclear weapons.
Second, on social and economic issues there has been a noticeable chilling in British-German relations centring on British calls for a reform of EU economic and social policy. Following the failure to ratify the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the UK sought to pick up the baton in European policy and attempted to outline an agenda for EU reform. The UK’s work program for its European Council Presidency in the second half of 2005 has focused on enhancing trade within the EU and with the developing world. In an article entitled ‚EU money for jobs, not cows‘ in Bild on June 21, 2005, Blair sought to convince the German electorate of his strategy by stressing that the EU spends seven times more on agriculture than on the combined investment in research and development, science, technology, training and innovation. This elicited a frosty response from Schroeder the next day in the same newspaper which stressed the ’selfishness‘ of British policy.
Schroeder’s last battle cry against the so-called Anglo-Saxon economic model at the informal EU summit at Hampton Court in October 2005 was a clear sign of Schroeder’s frustrations over Blair’s reform agenda for the EU. Part of this frustration is the result of what Charlie Jeffery and Willie Paterson have dubbed the ‚resource crunch‘ facing Germany. Due to high levels of unemployment and low rates of growth Germany has been left with less room for manoeuvre in finding agreement on the EU level with its major partners. Schroeder’s presence at the Hampton Court conference also served as a snub to the designated Chancellor Angela Merkel and to Tony Blair who had hoped that Merkel’s rise to power would signal a chance for improved relations between London and Berlin on economic issues. Recently, the main issue of contention in EU economic affairs has been the issue of the British EU rebate. Blair’s offer to put the British rebate on the table as part of a wider re-negotiation of the EU budget, particularly in the field of agricultural subsidies, further complicated relations between Schroeder and Blair, as Schroeder sided with Chirac in rejecting Blair’s proposal.
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