Eine der Hauptfragen, die dieser Artikel beantworten soll ist, ob das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und der Ukraine ein Jahr nach der ‚Orange Revolution‘ entscheidend besser ist als unter der Präsidentschaft von Kutschma (1994-2004). Die Verfasser dieses von der Stefan Batory Stiftung veröffentlichten Artikels sind Grzegorz Gromadzki und Oleksandr Sushko.
Introduction
The paper will also seek to establish whether those relations have now passed the Rubicon dividing rhetoric from concrete actions. Expectations, especially on the Ukrainian side, were very high at the beginning of 2005. One year later, two contradictory moods dominate relations – a kind of contentment on the one hand and a kind of disillusionment on the other.
Officially, relations are deemed satisfactory, as proclaimed by both sides during EU-Ukraine summit on 1 December 2005. The EU and Ukraine agreed that relations are ‘deeper and stronger’ than ever. They noted several achievements: first, the signing of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and significant progress in its implementation; secondly, the constructive role of Ukraine in the EU’s CFSP (in particular regarding the Transnistrian conflict and relations with Belarus); thirdly, the opening of negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement and finally, the de facto granting of market economy status to Ukraine according to EU Basic Antidumping Regulation.
But unofficially there are many disappointments on both sides. The EU representatives from European institutions and Member States criticise a lack of serious reform, above all in the sphere of the economy. They also note Ukraine’s slow progress in negotiations for WTO membership (Ukrainian authorities aimed to join the WTO in 2005) and the modest achievements in other areas, such as reform of the judiciary. Even officials positively predisposed towards Ukraine, such as the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, is on record as having said during visit of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov to Brussels on October 6, 2005 that ‘the future of Ukraine is in Europe. The best way to achieve it is not to discuss all the time European Union membership but to achieve concrete results, pragmatic results’. It is evident that the EU is waiting for concrete actions on the part of Ukraine if any form of progressive integration of Ukraine with the Union is to be achieved.
For their part, Ukrainian authorities are disappointed at the EU’s rather restrained policy towards Ukraine, above of all in regard to Ukraine’s membership perspective. Officially Ukrainian authorities have accepted the EU European Neighbourhood Policy (which makes no allowance for membership) but in fact they are deeply dismayed at being put in the same category with Northern Africa and Middle East countries.
What mood then dominates EU–Ukraine relations a year after the Orange Revolution – contentment or disillusionment? It should be noted that while it might seem that insufficient time has passed since the Orange Revolution to allow for profound changes in in EU–Ukraine relations, the authors of this paper deem that sufficient time has passed to draw conclusions as to whether or not the new style of governance in Ukraine has had an impact on relations and whether or not a change in the EU’s approach to Ukraine can be discerned.
To read the paper in full, visit the Stefan Batory Foundation website.