Die Chancen für einen Wahlsieg der kommunistischen
Regierungspartei der Republik Moldau (CPM) stehen gut, auch ohne
Wahlbetrug. Der Sieg dürfte jedoch nicht so groß sein
wie noch im Jahr 2001, so Jacek Wróbel
vom Centre for Eastern Studies.
However, if electoral abuse on a larger scale is uncovered,
widespread opposition protests may take place, but even then it is
rather unlikely that the opposition should reach for power
according to the “Ukrainian variant”.
What are the stakes?
The parliamentary election will be held in Moldova on 6th March.
Candidates contend for 101 mandates in the one-house parliament.
Shortly after the ballot, the parliament will elect the next
president of Moldova. The regulation under which the parliament
elects the president by a qualified majority (61 out of 101 votes),
enacted in 2000, has significantly increased the importance of
parliamentary elections, in which the stake is in fact the entire
power in the country. Presently, the Moldovan parliament and the
executive are dominated by the CPM. The communists have 71
mandates, and the CPM leader Vladimir Voronin is the country’s
president. In the upcoming election the communist party will face
two serious competitors: the Democratic Moldova coalition (DM) and
the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (CDPP), which staged the
anti-government demonstrations that lasted for several months in
the spring of 2002.
The candidates and their chances
The communists won the local elections in May 2003. The CPM
garnered 48 percent of votes in the elections for City and Regional
Councils, in which parties presently forming Democratic Moldova won
30 percent votes, and the CDPP – 7 percent. On 17th February two
pre-election polls were published. According to a survey by the
International Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies, the
CPM may hope for 48–49 percent of votes, DM for 25–26 percent, CDPP
for 10–11 percent, and the Social Democratic Party of Moldova
(SDPM) for 8–9 percent. According to the CIVIS analytic centre, the
communists are backed by 61.1 percent of voters, DM by 20.9
percent, CDPP by 12.1 percent, and SDPM by 4.4 percent (below the
electoral threshold). The remaining parties did not reach the
electoral threshold in either of the polls (the threshold is 6
percent for single parties, 9 percent for blocs comprising two
parties and 12 percent for blocs of three or more parties). The
polls thus suggest that a victory of the communists is almost
certain, although the scale of their win remains to be seen. The
CPM may well win absolute majority in parliament again, but it is
less likely that the communists should get a qualified majority
that would enable them to elect the president single-handedly. The
DM bloc will probably garner 20–30 percent of votes. Christian
Democrats of the CDPP have a stable electorate and get around 8
percent of votes in successive ballots. This time their showing
will probably be similar, or slightly better.
The campaign
Moldovan parties frequently resort to populist slogans in their
campaigns. The CPM pledges to transform Moldova into a modern
European state over the next parliamentary term. It promises a rise
of salaries to US$ 300 per month, 100 thousand new jobs, and higher
pensions. Democratic Moldova claims it will create 100 thousand new
jobs, increase salaries to US$ 250–300 per month, reduce taxes,
build free housing financed from public funds for the poorest, and
increase pensions. The CDPP promises to reduce poverty, create 200
thousand new jobs, and increase average salaries to EUR 250 and
minimum pensions to EUR 90.
Judging by the general character of the campaign, it targets a
desperate public of a society in which salaries average US$ 71.5,
pensions oscillate around US$ 17.5, and more than half a million
citizens (the total population being 4.4 million) work abroad, most
of them illegally.
Moldovan democracy under communist
rule
In the mid 1990s Moldova was regarded as a model example of
democracy among the CIS members. When the communists came to power
in 2001 certain abuses were committed, for example several
Christian Democrat opposition deputies had their parliamentary
privilege cancelled (this decision was subsequently repealed under
international pressure), and several “disobedient” journalists were
fired by the state radio and television. The public media are
controlled by the ruling team, while private television channels
and radio stations usually have limited reach. There is more
freedom of opinion in the press market. The circulation of
opposition newspapers accounts for 65 percent of the combined
circulation of all Moldovan newspapers, pro-government papers
accounting for 35 percent.
Will the vote be democratic?
The authorities have declared that they want a democratic,
transparent and fair election. On 10th January the Moldovan
president Vladimir Voronin invited the OSCE, the Council of Europe
and the European Union to send in observers. In the public media,
the presence of officials running in the elections was reduced to
the necessary minimum as of the beginning of the electoral
campaign, i.e. 1st January.
Nevertheless, there have been reports on abuses on the part of
the authorities. The CPM filed its election application even before
the law on the commencement of the electoral campaign was published
in the Official Journal. As a result, the communists got the
tactically superior first position in the list of candidates.
Members of the ruling team use “administrative resources” for the
purpose of their campaigns (official transport, official
telephones, and field “working visits” of high administration
officials who are obviously electioneering). Opposition parties
complain about police surveillance of their electoral meetings and
incidents involving the police, such as the removal of CDPP’s
electoral banners in Ungheni, pressure on electioneers exerted by
the security forces or even arrests of campaigners, as reported by
the SDPM.
Finally, there is the problem of providing an effective
opportunity to vote to Moldovans working abroad (the opposition’s
potential electorate) and to Moldovan citizens residing in the
separatist Transnistria.
The West on the election
On 10th and 11th December 2004 delegates of the Venice
Commission (advisory body of the Council of Europe) visited
Chisinau where they evaluated the Moldovan electoral laws as very
good. On 9th February the European Union appealed to the
authorities of Moldova to hold free and fair elections. The US
Department of State communicated on 17th February that the abuses
committed by the authorities in the course of the campaign were
alarming and put the legitimacy of elections into doubt. A clash in
the relations between the West and Moldova came with the protest of
the communist electoral club leader Victor Stepaniuc. On 9th
February Stepaniuc objected to the financing of the union of
non-governmental organisations called “Coalition-2005” Civil
Coalition for Free and Fair Elections by western countries and
organisations. On 11th February the embassies of seven EU Member
States, the US embassy and the OSCE Mission issued a statement
saying that their support for Coalition 2005 was provided within
the framework of pro-democracy programmes and was not meant to
support any particular party.
Russia on the election
The electoral campaign has brought on a serious deterioration of
Moldovan-Russian relations. In the run-up to the ballot, the
government camp stepped up its anti-Russian rhetoric. What is more,
contrary to Moscow’s expectations, no CIS observers were invited to
Moldova.
Moscow appears to be closely watching Moldova’s unfolding
campaign. However, since all major political forces in Moldova
oppose the stationing of Russian troops in Transnistria and call
for Moldova’s participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration
structures, Russia has very little room for manoeuvre. All it can
do is try to force president Voronin to mitigate its policies where
they affect Russia’s interests. To this end, the Russian
authorities and the media co-operating with them have been carrying
out a propaganda campaign. They have repeatedly accused Moldova of
violating international agreements (e.g. concerning the access of
international observers to Transnistria or participation of the
separatist republic’s citizens in elections), and of an anti-Russia
spy mania (several tens of Russian Federation citizens have been
detained in Moldova in recent months). Russia has also threatened
to impose economic and visa sanctions. Wordings of this kind were
included in the Duma resolution passed on 18th February and in
several statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Does Moldova face an outbreak?
In January the Chisinau City Council allowed the CDPP’s to hold
rallies meant to express the public’s assessment of the ballot in
the central square of the city in the post-election period (7th –
22nd March). The request to hold such rallies suggests that the
Christian Democrats intend to stage protests following the
election, even if there are only minor cases of electoral fraud on
the part of the authorities. Democratic Moldova may join the CDPP’s
protests. The two opposition camps are co-operating although there
are some clashes in their relations.
Holding a fair election is in the best interest of the present
authorities. It will deprive radical opposition of arguments
justifying protests. The communists are popular and they are in a
position to succeed in a fair election, even if the success is
going to be less spectacular than in 2001.
Further developments will depend mostly on whether the governing
camp choose to hold fully democratic elections. The opposition is
intent on unsparingly pinpointing any and all abuses in the course
of the ballot. It remains to be seen whether this is going to spark
a widespread protest campaign after the election, although some
kind of protests will certainly take place. The opposition’s
activities are apparently inspired by the Ukrainian and the
Georgian revolution, and the events that accompanied last year’s
elections in Romania. Opposition journalists predict that that the
“rose revolution” and “orange revolution” scenario will repeat
itself on the Dniester. The ruling communists, on the other hand,
maintain that the revolution has already taken place: in 2001 the
CPM reached for power and dismantled the criminal oligarchic and
business system.
It seems that no democratic revolution of the Ukrainian or
Georgian type is going to take place in Moldova. The behaviour of
the communists to date suggests that they intend to adhere at least
to the basic principles of democracy. The democratic system of
government in Moldova functions better than it did in Ukraine under
Leonid Kuchma, and much better than in Georgia under Eduard
Shevardnadze. On the other hand, the opposition has radicalised to
some extent, and partly consolidated as two co-operating camps. The
CDPP has already demonstrated its ability to stage lasting protest
campaigns. Democratic Moldova has managed to unite a wide range of
parties, and Serafim Urechean, one of its leaders, is a very
popular politician.