Während sich die internationale Gemeinschaft auf Verhandlungen
über den Status des Kosovo vorbereitet, betont der
Bürgerbeauftragte der Provinz, dass zu einer langen Reihe von
Minderheitenfragen gründliche Überlegungen angestellt werden
müssen. Dies schreibt Marek Antoni Nowicki
für Transitions Online.
Nobody knows what lies in store for Kosovo as the international
community, local leaders, and ordinary citizens prepare for the
talks on Kosovo’s status that are likely to unfold over this and
next year.
On the one hand, Kosovo Albanians yearn for independent
statehood, and many seem to be under the impression that such a
wish could be granted rather soon. What they fail to understand is
that independence would not immediately, or necessarily, usher in
an era of prosperity and freedom.
On the other hand, most Kosovo Serbs reject the idea of
independence outright. They see independence as legitimating the
“ethnic cleansing” of the province and as validating the project to
create a Greater Albania. Independence would mean that there would
no longer be a place for them in a land that they regard,
historically and mythically, as the cradle of Serbian cultural and
spiritual identity.
If Kosovo is indeed accorded some sort of independence, the
Kosovo Serbs, who have long thought of themselves as part of a
larger entity (that of Serbia), will for the first time really
become a minority community in a new political landscape with which
they would find it difficult to identify. For all the consequences
this implies, are they mentally prepared for such a likely
reality–a reality dominated by a tightly knit network of big
Kosovo Albanian families that run the region in a somewhat
exclusive, clan-like fashion?
Poverty and anger
Let’s take an honest, hard look at Kosovo today: Poverty is
widespread, and a considerable number of people endure difficult,
even harsh, daily living conditions. There is a significant gap
between those who are receiving meager social welfare assistance
and those who are not, not to mention massive unemployment and a
fast-growing youth population with few meaningful
prospects.
I hear a great deal of discussion about how such dire living
conditions breed a growing sense of frustration and anger among the
population. But one must remember that this frustration is not
unique to one ethnic group in Kosovo. Everyone is suffering under
the current circumstances, albeit in a different manner. But the
people who tend to suffer first are the most vulnerable
populations–usually, but not only, the minority communities. And
in Kosovo, even Serbs do not occupy the lowest rung of the
ladder.
The Kosovo Serbs are better off than other non-Albanians in the
province because they receive significant support from the Serbian
government. Without that support, it is doubtful the Serb community
could have survived the past five years.
But assistance, financial and otherwise, also reinforces a sense
of loyalty and dependence towards Serbia. An independent Kosovo
would mean being cut off from such support and living with the
consequences. Would the Kosovo budget be able to assume this
additional cost, to assist an unloved minority?
Apart from these daily social, political, and material factors,
there are other elements that make people irritated and
non-cooperative. During a recent conversation, the speaker of the
Kosovo Assembly, Nexhat Daci, asked, how can a frustrated majority
take care of its minorities? Such statements are key to
understanding what’s going on in Kosovo.
To read the article in full, visit the Transitions Online website.